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Abstract
A 又I.! nda }, I

is the \'olll l1l inOllS policy düc lI ment th司 t emanated from the 1992 United Nati0ns
on [nvironment and De 、 elopmen t. Ls ing a brief case study of China's en~rg:
lI se- specitìcall y its lI se of coal- this article illu s trate 州 o\\' the objecti ves of Agenda 21 me
ref1 cctcd in China's cconomi c d叭 elop l1l ent policics and practices \V e address thesc kìnd s of
questions . Has China endea\'()ured to impkment (，II\ ' irο11 月 lentally sustainah!e development ‘
as rencctcd in t lJ e chaptèrs of Agenda 2 J? Wh糾正!oc s the case of energy use tell us about the
lI tilily of Agend J. 2 J ohjecti\'es in China and other dC \'l,: loping countries? \V hat are some of
the political and economic Ülctors that in f1l1cnccd this process? More broadly , what docs thc
Chincs~ case tell us about thc impkmentation 0 1' \'olllntary international environmcntal
agreements il1 the de\'cloping 叭。 rld? V/e conclud心 that China has been stimulated by Agcnda
21 :lIl d othcr intcrnatiollal instrllments 、 along \\ith othèr factors . to shift its ccono l11 ic
c1 e\-e!op l11 cnt to\\'ard a 111 0\'(' (，!l\ ' ironmcntall:- 日lI s tainabk trajectory. as re f1 ected in its
changing policies 011 cnergy dcri 丸 ed Jì'om coal bllrnìng Howevel\bccause economic gro\\1h
r巳 mains ccnt t'a l 1O ck \ 'C lopmcnt 巴 o al 趴 thcse policiö are 0111;- a stmt to\\'arcl environmc l1 tall~
stlst ainabk d ,,'\'clopmc Jlt. En \'ironmcntal dcclinc ;;t ill olltpaces sllstainabk dc\'elopment
Conl~rence

,

,

Introduction
When politicians , economists and diplomats talk about China they express concern about
~'t

Asian security , economics and trade , and human rights. But they also now routinely invoke
the potential for econom i<: development in China to do great harm to the natural environnlènt
of East Asia and indeed the entire globe. They also express concern about environnlentrelated impacts on the health ofthe Chinese people and their economy. Because ofthe
potentially adverse environmental consequences of Chinese development , one observer has
described China as an "environmental bombshell" viaiting to explode. 2 Many people think the
best way for the Chinese "bombshell" to be defused is through enν ironmentally sustainable
economic developmen t. Here we define "sustainable development" as economic development
in harmony with the environment , or more realistically development that balances economic
and environmental goals and thereby does Iimited harm to the environmen t. The notion of
sustainable development was codified in Agenda 訓， the voluminous policy document that
emanated from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED , meeting at the "Earth Summit" in Ri o de Janeiro). Agenda 21 offers guidelines that
China can use to move its de\'elopment path toward greater envirorunental sustainability.J
Sustainable development is now perceived to be an important issue in China. lt gained
support in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1 996-2000) , and the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party
Congress (September 1997) stated that sustainable dcvelopment strategies must be
4

implemented. This sentiment \\'a5 subsequently reiterated by goverrunent officials at aIl
Ic 丸'els ，

including the premier and the president , and has been reflected in policy changes

designecl to actualise sustainable developmen t. 5 To be sure , China has experienced
monumental environmcntal problems associated with its rapid economic gro\\-1h. Among the
l11 0re

pWlllinent environmental problems fíJ cing China are rapid depletion ofland through

CO I1 \εrsio l1

0 1' agricultur íJ! bnd (0 cO ll1l1l ercial l1 ses ‘ poll l1 tion of a11 kinds ‘ notably \\-ater

'可

po l1l1 tion from industrialization and popu1ation growth. and air polllltion from automobi1es
and the burning of coa1; degradation of soi1 , forests and grasslands; increased soil erosion;
and the general adverse and broad ímpacts ofthe world's largest population. 6 In the long
term , these adverse environmental consequences of economìc growth wi lI pose tremendous
challenges for China's economic development , political stability , and the hea1th ofthe
youngest generation in China (not to mentíon the well being ofthose living in other countries ,
and that of other species). The Chinese govemrnent has taken notice
Our objective in this article is to use a brief case study of China's energy usespecifically its use of coal-to illustrate and understand ho\\" the

0句 ectives

of Agenda 21 are

reflected in China's economic dèvelopmen t. We begin asking these kinds of questions: Has
China endeavoured to implement sllstainable

developmen t.的 reflected

in the chapters of

Agenda 21 ? What does the case of energy use tell us about the utility of Agenda 21
objectives in China and perhaps other developing countries: What are some ofthe political
and economic factors that influenced this process? More broadly , ，、'hat does the Chinese case
tell us about the implementation of voluntary intemational environmental agreements in the
developing

\V

orld?

After further explanation of our research. in the next part of this article we say more
about the notion of sustainable

developme叭，

and we discuss some ofthe objectives of

Agènda 2 1. We then look directly at the degree to which economic development in China has
re f1 ected the objectives of several important parts of Agenda 21 , using Chinese coal
production and use as an indicative case. We conclude with observations about what the case
of China tells us about the implementation of Agenda 21 and voluntary international
envÍronmental aQreements
、d

Why
R mon 芒 them

h~\ 'e

we cbosen the China case?

011ξcan

tìnd many justífications , but chief

is Cbina's size and potential impact on th c' natural environmen t. Like other

developing countries , it justifiably seeks to improve the living standards of its people
However , should this be done in an environmentally unsustainable manner-as it has been so
far , for the most p缸t-the adverse impacts will be felt not only locally and nationally , but
regionally and globally. China already has some ofthe most polluted cities in the world , but
soon it will overtake the United States as the primary source ofpolluting emissions that
contribute to global climate change. The sources of air pollution in Beijing and

Shanghai 紅院

consequently , also sources of climate change in Sao Paulo and Dhaka (and New York and
London). Thus a better understanding of the Chinese case could have substantial benefits for
countless people in China and beyond. Furthermore , China can be viewed

臼 indicative

of

large developing countries that are trying to promote sustainable development-that is ,
countries seeking to balance long term environmental protection with short and medium term
economic growth and development
To be sure , one case is not enough to make sweeping generalizations about
sustainable development , Agenda 21 , and the implementation of other voluntary international
environmental agreements. However , the Chinese case goes a long way toward these ends
Added to the research already done in this field , this brief case study can therefore be
enlightening

Sustainable Development and Agenda 21

International Eoviroomental Diplomacy and Sustainable Developmeot
Environmental issues emerged on the international agenda with the 1972 Stockholrn
Conference on the Hllman Environment. The govenunents of 114 countries agreed that their
environmental fortunes were interconnected , and that they shared a single global commons
Among the important products ofthe Stockholm conference were the Stockholm Declaration ,

4

the establishment ofthe United Nations Environment Program 肛肘EP)， and the surrounding
attention 也at contributed to creation of domestic envirorunental protection ministries. 7 明也ile
出e

conference was largely devoted to environmental matters , reflecting the preferences of the

industrialized developed countries, it also brought attention to questions of economic
development that would be even more salient in future intemational environmental
conferences. The Stockholm Declaration was a set of sometimes conflicting principles, some
reasserting sovereignty, others highlighting the need to compromise it to

de叫 effectively wi也

environmental issues. UNEP soon encountered resistance 岳om developed

countri郎，

which

wanted to avoid paying for new environmental programs abroad, and from developing
countries , which feared that environmental concems would divert attention away from
economic developmen t. Other UN institutions also resisted making UNEP a strong body
within the United Nations. They did not want to cede their own new environment-related
programs to UNEP.8 Thus the Stockholrn conference initially had little favourable impact on
the Earth's environment. Nevertheless, the Stockholm conference raised awareness among
publics and governments about the importance of intemational emironmental cooperation,
and UNEP would eventually take on an important role in intemational enviroIimental
deliberations.9
Twenty ye缸s after the Stockholm conference , diplomats

企om

nearly 180 còuntries

attended the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environrnent and Development in Ri o de
Janeiro , making it the largest international conference to that date. Indeed, 118 heads öfstate
or government spoke at this "Earth Surnmit," reflecting the growing intemational interest in
environmental issues since Stockholm. Am ong the products ofthe Ri o sUIìlmit were the Rio
Declaration , a statement of principles that governments agreed to consider as
foster environmentally sustainable development;

aσreement

p缸t

of efforts to

on conventions dealing with

climate change and biodiversity; establishment of a UN Commission on Sustainable

5

Development (CSD) , which was intended to promote sustainable development across the UN
system and to foster international funding of related programs; a weak statement on
protecting and managing the world's forests; and Agenda 21. 10 Perrneating UNCED and its
declarations was the demand by developing countries that "new and addition a1" funds be
provided by the developed countries for the pu中oses of environmentally sustainable
development
Wh ether the Ri o surnmit was a success was the focus of "Earth Summit II ," held in

New York in 1997. It was agreed that UNCED was somewhat successful in giving new
energy to the goals of the Stockholm conference, and 出at it provided important guidance for
environmental programs and stimulated ongoing negotiations on specific important issues
like climate change. But new action on protecting the global environment was incrementa1 at
best, and the commitment by developed countries to provide new aid to the developing world
went unfulfilled. Diplomats and environmentalists realized that environmental protection
would be a slow, ongoing process.

11

What emanated from Stockholm and Ri o was a genera1

agreement among governments that a move toward sustainable development was needed , and
that it ought to begin sooner rather than later. But, despite two decades of discussions , this
still begged the question ofwhat sustainable development would entail
Probably the most authoritative-and

certainly 出e

most frequently cited-d efinition

of sustainable development comes from the 1987 report of the Brundtland Comrnission (the
Wo rI d Commission on Environment and Development) , Dur Common Future. This report's
definition served as the basis for UN plans for UNCED and associated statements and
agreements , including Agenda 21. According to that repo此， sustainable development is
"development which meets the needs ofthe present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet theír o \Vn needs." 12 The precise meaning of sustainab1e

6

development will always vary , depending on the issue and the actors involved. We can say ,
however，也at

sustainable development encompasses several important areas:

First, the concept clearly represents an a即mpt to bridge the concems and interests of
developed and developing nations , but it applies to both. . .. Second , it a悅mpts to
reconcile economic growth and environrnental protection, rather than viewing them 位
tradeoffs; indeed, the Brundtland Report argues that neither is possible without the
「

other. Third, the concept is strongly anthropocentric. It starts from the premise 甘lllt
human needs must be met in order to address environmental problems. Thus
improvement in living conditions in poor countries . . . is an essential precondition for
ecological preservation. Fourth , the limits to growth are not ultimately physical or
biological but social and technological; it is assurned 也at environmental problems can
be solved. F.inally , the concept is extremely general, lacking in specific content as to
how sustainable development is to be attained or who is responsible for achieving it.
Th is vagueness was deliberate; it allows the idea to be adopted by virtually everyone

as a way of bringing people together to seek cornmon ground. In this formulation it is
clearly a political and social construct, not a scientific concept or blueprint. 13

Agenda 21
Wh ich among these foci of sustainable development is most impo rtarIt is no doubt subject to

differing views , including within China. It is essential to realize that all of Agenda 21 is a
result of political bargaining during international deliberations. As such, its chapters and
paragraphs are open to multiple interpretations , just like the underlying concept of sustainable
developmen t. It would be wrong to assume that each government's definition of "sustainable
development" is the same. In areas most affected by pollution, environmental considerations

7

may be foremost; in areas suffering more poverty , development willlikely be the dominant
consideration. In some instances sustainability , in the environmental sense , will be the
primary goal; in others, it will be seen as a

meαns

to economic growth and assistance from

central authorities or intemational institutions. lndeed, even within countries, not least one
the size and complexity ofChina, meanings ofthe tenn and its practic a1 implications will
vary. Important1 y , Agenda 21 is not a binding agreement. It is a set of recommendations onl y.
This begs the question of why govemments would implement Agenda 21. Selfinterest is the obvious explanation. In this case China can benefit from invoking technology
assistance and fmancial aid arrangements outlined in Agenda 21 (which are more concretely
codified in intemational environmental treaties , such as the Framework Convention on
Climate Change). But this does not explain everything. Governments are also interested in
doing , or being seen as doirig , the "right"
community. Wh ile compliance wi出

thing 企om

intemational

the perspective of the intemational

environmenta1 treaties is expected and quite

often forthcoming , even voluntary intemational agreements can inf1uence state behavior by
gradually reshaping conceptions of national interests in line with emergent intemational
norrns

14

Agenda 21 is broken down into four main sections (comprising 40 chapters): Social
and Economic Dimensions , Conservation and Management of Resources for Development,
Strengthening the Role ofMajor Groups , and Means oflmplementation. It includes
something for almost eve可one. Wh at comes through from a reading of Agenda 21 is the goal
of achieving sustainable development , or more directly promoting economic development
(usually meaning economic growth) without unnecessa可

and

excessive harrn to the

environment. For better or worse , Agenda 21 is concemed most of all with the well-being of
people (not animals , plants and the ecosystem per se). The natural environment is valuable , in
this interpretation , because it benefits humans. Explicit is the need to reduce poverty and raise

8

living standards in the poor countries. This is to be done through fostering an international
trading system favourable to developing ∞凹的es， through greater intemational assistance in
the forms of fmancing and technology , and through national plans, stàltegies and policies. 15
As Bryner has argued, sustainable development "requires the creation of new incentives and
penalties 由at

promote sustainable activity; revising national economicindicators to re f1 ect

environmental considerations; reforms that ensure that market prìces include more of the true
costs of production; and addressing the problem of falling commodity prices 也叫

encourages

developing coun仕ies to export natural resources at unsustainable rates." 16 These goals are laid
out in Agenda 21.
We examine several ofthese areas below, usingb the case of coal use in China as an
indicative case study of their implementation (or not). It is not possible here to survey the
ways in which all Agenda 21 chapters and objectives are reflected in China's development
policies. Here we focus on portions of three chapters dealing with industrial economics and
甘ade

(Chapter 2) , atmospheric pollution (Chapter 9) , and fmancing considerations (Chapter

33). This sampling of Agenda 21 chapters provides a cross-section of important areas and
sectors that must be considered in the context of implementing sustainable development on
the ground.

Domestic Policïes Re/ated to

Sustainαble

Deve/opment

Chapter 2 of Agenda 21 addresses international cooperation to accelerate sustainable
development in developing countries, and related domestic policies. 17 Hence it tries to make
the essential connections between international deliberations and interstate cooperation, on
the one hand , and sustainable development on the ground in developing countries , on the
othe r. Chapter 2 begins by focusing on creation of an international economic climate
favourable to countries undergoing development (in many ways ignoring env Ïr onmentaI

9

issues). The main concem of the chapter is promotion of sustainable development through
trade. It brings toge出er international and national

e叮orts ，

pointing out that "reactivation and

4

acceleratìon of development requires both a dynamic and a supportive intemational economic
environment and determined policies at the nationalleve l. It will be frustrated in the absence
of either ofthese requirements. ,, 18 Here we focus on the portions ofChapte~ 2 dedicated to
management-related activities that maximize the benefits oftrade liberalization for
sustainable development (p ara. 2.14[c]) and 由at encourage domestic policies conducive to
sustainable development (p ara.

2.37[月) ，

in particular market-based pricing of commodities

Much of Chapter 2 is dedicated to specific policy mechanisms. According to
Paragraph 2.14( c) , countries should adopt , "with respect to commodities consistent with
market efficiency ," policies that "reflect efficient and sustainable use offactors ofproduction
in the formation of commodity prices , including the reflection of environmental , social and
resources costs." More specificaI1y, according to Chapter 2,

all countries should develop policies that improve efficiency in the allocation of
reso盯ces

and take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the changing global

economic environmen t. In particular, wherever appropriate , and taking into account
national strategiesωld objectives , countries should: 19

Remove the barriers to progress caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies , administrative
strains , unnecessary controls and the neglect of market conditions;20

Provide scope for appropriate economic

instrumen俗 ，

including market mechanisms ,

in harmony with the objectives of sustainable development and fulfilment of basic
neeos;21
>

10

Promote the operation of effective tax systems and financial sectors. 22

1n other words , the prices of goods and services should reflect their true costs to the
enviro凹的肘，

to society , and to the coun旬r's resource base. More specifically, these

paragraphs arguably mean th剖 the prices of commodities should not be reduced by
government subsidies , but instead should be determined by the market. Yet in so m個y
countries-both developed and developing , China included-the prices of goods and serv ic-es
frequently do not reflect their real costs to society and to the natural environment. For
example, coal , water and wood would be much higher in price in China were their true costs
reflected. (Again, the same can be said for developed countries. They are not the focus of our
analysis , however.)

Atmo亮pheric

and Air Pollution

1n Chapter 9, Agenda 21 focuses on protection ofthe atmosphere , which is threatened by a
myriad of pollutants from countless sources戶 Chapter 9 recommends actions related to
transportation , industrial development, terrestrial and marine resource development and land
use , stratospheric ozone depletion , and transboundary atmospheric poIl ution?4 There is
recognition that atmosphe丘c poIlution is first a problem of economics, and specifically of
energy and resource use. Below we examine ways in which Agenda 21 paragraphs dealing
with energy (coal)

developme帥，

efficiency and consumption are actualized (intentionally or

not) in China.
Energy use is essential to development, as the paragraphs in Chapter 9 acknowledge.
However , much energy worldwide "is currently produced and consumed in ways that could
not be sustained iftechnology were to remain constant and if overal1 quantities were to

11

increase substantially. ,, 25 Agenda 21 recognizes the "need to control atmospheric emissions of
greenhouse and other gases , and substances wiU increasingly need to be based 011 efficiency
.,.

in energy" use and increased reliance on new energy sources , with all energy necessarily used
in ways that "respect the atmosphere , human health and the environment as a whole. ,, 26 But
global energy use is growing , particularly in many developing countries. lndeed , in China
energy use is having the adverse local , regional and glob a1 impacts anticipated by Agenda 21 ,
and within a generation China is likely to overtake the United States as the world's largest
energy user (in aggregate , not per capita).27

Financial Resources and lvfechanisms

Chapter 33 of Agenda 21 addresses the important capacity-building issue of fmancial
resources and mechanisms?8 This was one ofthe most contentious issues in the UNCED
negotiations , salting open wounds from the developing countries' failed attempts in previous
decades to create a New International Economic Order and to compel more development
funding 企om

North to South. However , demonstrating the inf1 uence of developing countries

in the environmental issue area , Chapter 33 is permeated with calls for "new and additional"
(sometimes written as "substantially new and additional") financial resources and technology ,
specifically to be provided on highly concessional terrns or as grants by developed countries
to the developing countries戶 This new and additional funding for Agenda 21 and other
UNCED programs was expected to come from multilateral development banks (including the
lnternational Development Association and the newly established Global Environmental
Facility) , specialized agencies ofthe United Nations and other international organizations and
multilateral institutions , bilateral assistance programs , debt relief, and private funding叩 New
forms of public and private financing were also to be explored , including , for example ,
tradable permits. 31

12

Wh ile Agenda 21 acknowledges that financing will come from each country's public

and private sectors , Chapter 33 cal1s on the developed countries to

increase 也eir

official

development assistance (ODA):32

For developing countries, particularly the least developed countries , ODA is a main
source of external funding , and substantial new and additional funding for sustainable
development and implementation of Agenda 21 will be required. Developed countries
reaffirm their commitments to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 per cent
of GNP for ODA and , to the extent that they have not yet achieved 也at target, agree
to augment their aid prograrnmes in order to reach that target as soon 臼 possible and
to ensure prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 訂戶

It was agreed 也at the new Commission on Sustainable Development would monitor progress
toward 也is

goal.

\\也ile

all of Agenda 21 is, again, voluntary , this call for new funds 祖d

concessional technology transfe時， as well 自由e reaffirrnation ofthe 0.7 percent ODA targe t,
was a victory for developing countries, arguably reflecting their newfound power in the
context of growing concern in the developed countries about adverse environmental changes
from unsustainable development in developing countries戶 Explicit throughout Agenda 21 ,
and indeed the intemational negotiations on it and related matters, was the understanding that
developing countries would not , and 缸guably could not , make a full transition to
sustainability if new funds and technology assistance were not forthcoming. Insofar 也

ODA

has not come into line with the UN target-indeed, it fell far short, dropping through the
1990s-the likelihood of more sustainable development is reduced. This shortfalI was
replaced by private investment in some countries , much of it directed at China (but very little
has gone to the poorest coun出的 that arguably need it the most).

13

Economic Developmeot io Chioa and the Objectives of Agenda 21: The Case of Coal
Since Agenda 21 was agreed by intemational consensus in 1992, China has paid much more
attention to environrnental conservation and sustainable development , even while prioritising
economic growth. China has experienced rapid economic growth and significant positive
developments for the environrnent. However , many serious environrnental problems remain
unsolved, and overall environmental conditions continue to deteriorate rapidly. In this
section, we focus on the problem of air pollution in China (one of its most pressing
environrnental concems). We wiU argue , mainly from an economic viewpoint, that China's
coaI pricing policy is important for its sustainable developmen t. We wiIl also look at how
indicative Agenda 21 is for China's coaI pricing policy. We look first at China's economic
development strategy after the advent of Agenda 21 ，但

well

as related unsolved problems

(e.g. , future coaI shortages and sulphur dioxide emissions). We then look at measures 曲的
could be taken

(iιchanges

to coal pricing policy) and the obstacles to implementing these

measures. We focus on the three chapters of Agenda 21 described above , asking specificaIly
how they might apply to China's coal pricing policy. In our subsequent conclusion we point
out that while Agenda 21 has its limitations, it does indeed provide indicative
China-and arguably other developing

lnternatìonal Action

00

countries一-to

guid叩ce

for

implement sustainable developmen t.

Sustainable Development and China's Agenda 21

Though China already took steps for sustainable development, a丘er agreement on Agenda 21
it carried out more environmental conservation, while putting a priority on economic growth.
Agenda 訓，

and the outside actors and intemational negotiations shaping it and cJ osely related

environmental agreements , have in f1u.enced China's policies and practices on sustainable
developmen t. Elizabeth Economy has shown that "intemational actors have had a significant

14

inf1 uence in shaping Chinese domestic environmental politics and foreign relations. The
demands of participating in global environmental regirnes have forced Chinese leaders to
establish new domestic institutions and processes for rnanaging their participation in those
regirnes. Most important, these new institutions and processes favour the interests of the
environmentally proactive actors within China by radically reconfiguring the very nature of
PRC environmental politics." J5 As Lester Ross argues , "International pressure on the PRC to
conforrn its conduct to international environmental norms influences dornestic policy making
in support of environmental regulation,"J6 and Yu-shi Mao has observed that international
envÎronmental agreements , "regardless of whether China has signed up to thern or not , are a
significant force in promoting environmental protection in China. ,,37 More broadly , the
Chinese government wants to show the world cares about environmental issues , notably by
taking voluntary action to curb the use of energy

con仕ibuting

to climate change, thereby

reinforcing its "clairn and self-perception as a m吋 or player in world politics and to be the
leader of and speaker for developing countries." JS
Thus , in the period surrounding the 1992 Earth Summit (UN CED) from which
Agenda 21 emerged, China created many new agencies and promulgated new programs and
regulations geared toward environmental protection戶 According to Economy , "lJNCED had
a profound effect on envirorunental policies , institutions , and thinking in the PRC. In terms of
actual policy change, the most important result ofthe UNCED was the formation of a
Chinese action plan to implement a policy of sustainable development." 40 Within the space of
one year China created its own Agenda 21 , which was based on one emanating from the
Earth Summit-;-the first country to do so. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that the
influence of Agenda 21 and associated international deliberations were unable to counter all
of the bureaucratic , political and economic forces in China pushing against more robust
implementation of sustainable developmen t. Hence , while "international negotiations have
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induced some remarkable adjustments of Chinese institutions" in this issue area,41 and
China's policies and actions are more sustainable than they would be, they are far from what

..
p

is necess訂Y to protect the environment

China's Agenda 21 was completed in April 1993. In March 1994 the Chinese State
Council adopted
Envirorunent and Development in the 21 st Centu句" (China's Agenda 21). The coverage of
China's Agenda 21 is wide: legislation, policies , educatio n, agricu1ture , environment , energy,
transportation , regional development , population , health , and their mutual relation to one
another. The main themes ofthis agenda arose first from the need foreconomic development ,
and then from concerns about protecting the environment for sustainable development. The
following statement explains:

Because China is a developing country, the goals ofincreasing social
productivity , enhancing overall national strength and improving people's quality
of life cannot be realized without giving primacy to the development of the
national economy and having all work focused on building the economy. . .
Given this

siωation ，

the Chinese Government can only consider strategies for

development that are sustainable and only by coordinating the work of all
segments of society can it successfully reach its already defined second and
third strategic objectives of quadrupling its GNP
the

centu可 and

against 出at

of 1980 by the end

increasing per capita GNP to the levels of moderately developed

countries. At the same time , it will be necessary to conserve natural resources
and to improve the environment, so that the country will see long-term , stable
developmen t. 42
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Regarding the environment, China has improved its regulatory practices. For example in the
area of air qtiality control , in 1995 the Air polI ution Prevention and Control Law (frrst
promulgated in 1987), was amended to include tougher regulations for controlling sulphur
dioxide
China has received substantial international aid and loans for environmental
protection projects. lndeed, four-fifths of its budget for envirorunental protection comes for
international aidρSince 1992 , China has been the largest borrower from the World Bank,
and in the past several

ye缸s

lending for environmental protection has become the fastest

growth area ofthe World Bank's programs in China.44 China is also the largest borrower 企om
the Asian Development Bank. 45 As for bilateral aid , for China the larg己st bilateral donor is
Japan. The Japanese government's concessionalloans were , in the past, mainly for
transportation projects. Since 1995 however , loans for environment-related projects (i.e.,
environmental conservation, sewerage and cleaner power plants) have become the primary
objects of aid (Figure 1) .46

17

Figure 1: The Japanese Government's Offical Development
Assistant Loans to China by Sector
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Note : The data and loan amounts are at the approval base, which may differ from the disbursement
base. Some loans for environment-related projects are categorised into sectors other than
Environmen t. For example , loans for c1 eaner power plants fall into Electric power
Source: Edited by the authors with data from Japan 8ank for International Cooperation , "Economic
Cooperation: ODA

P吋 ect

Data ," available from

http ://帆'IW .jbic.go .j p/engl is h/oec/projectl

index.php , accessed 5 June 2002

Energy Use in China: Dirty Coal
These and many other recent eff0l1s by China have been somewhat positive for
environmenta l1 y sustainable developmen t. As for economic growth , China is among the
world's five fastest growing economies. Ri sing incomes have eased poverty and improved
health in large parts ofthe country. As for air pollution , some cities have seen ambient air
quality improvements. Particulate emissions have remained relatively f1 at since 1980,
implying a substantial increase in controls given the near doubling of coal consumption.

47

However , substantial problems remain for sustuinable developmen t. Concerning economic
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growth , coal shortages will pose challenges. Regarding pollution, sulphur dioxide emissions
and the resulting acid rain remain major problems.
China's is an energy-scare economy，叫出 per capita coal endowments far below the
wo rJ d average (TabJe 1)叫
Table 1: Coal Endowments

us

~ussia

World

114,500

249,994

157,010

984 ,453

1,275 ,133

283 ,230

145 ,491

6 ,056 ,715

90

883

1,079

163

China
Proved recoverable reserves of coal at the
end of 1999 (million tonnes)
Population as of 2000 (thousand)
Coal reserves per capita (thousand tonnes)

Note: Proved recoverable reserves are the tonnage that can be ex甘acted from the earth under present
and expected local economic conditions with existing available technology.
Source: For coal reserves , as Table 2. For population, United Nations, "United Nations Population
Network," available from http://www.un.org/popinJdata.html. accessed 5 June 2002

No other major economy is as reliant on coal as is China. Al though the recent increase in oil
imports moderately reduces its relative significance, coal' s share of primary energy supply in
China remains the highest among all the types of energy resources-the proportion was 68
percent in 1999. 49 Wh ile the known coal reserves in China are 12 percent ofthe entire
world's , China's coal consumption amounts to 24 percent ofthe wo rJ d's. Clùna's RfP ratio
(coal reserves divided by annual production) is, therefore , lllyears-far below other regions'
ratios (Table 2)
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T a ble 2: RIP Ratio
Proved recoverable reserves
of coal at the end of

1999~

Production in 1999

Rl P ratio

(b)

(alb)

(a)
(million tonnes)

(mi l1 ion tonnes)

(years)

55,367

231

240

North America

257,966

1,080

239

SOllth America

21 ,752

46

474

Africa

114,500

1,030

111

Asia excluding China

137,808

640

215

Russian Federation (RF)

157,010

249

630

155,676

758

205

China

E lI rope excluding RF
Middle East
Oceania
World

1,710

2

1,140

82,664

308

269

984,453

4,343

227

Source: World Energy Council (訊屯C)， "Survey ofEnergy Resources,"
http://www.worldenergy.orglwec-geis/publications/reports/serlcoal/coal.asp , accessed 4
June 2002

Wh ile removal ofparticulates (which is relatively simple) improves , sulphur dioxide
emissions remain nearly out of control and still the primary cause of China's air pollution.
sulphur dioxide emissions , generated mainly from the burning of coal , have roughly
paralleled the increase in coal consumption.50 Unless there are serious efforts to curb
emissions in the near future , annual sulphur dioxide emissions from China may rise by an
estimated 50 percentbetween 1993 and 2010. 51 The environmental effects ofsulphur dioxide
emissions occur primarily through acid rain. Because the quantity of sulphur dioxide being
discharged in China is increasing , the total surface area suffering from acid rain continues to
expand. Acid rain in centraJ and southwestern parts of China is relatively severe , while the
situation in the south is getting worse . The area affected by acid rain is about 30 percent of
52

China's totalland area.

Moreover, the problem is spreading to South Korea and Japan ,

where studies in some prefectures identify halfthe acidic fallout as originating in China 幻
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Chína's inefficient use of coal is the proximate cause of íts massíve coal consumption
and resulting sulphur dioxide emissions. Coal accounts for an estimated 90 percent of China's
sulphur dioxide emissions generated from fossil fuel consumption.
from coal remains

di伍cult

54

The cleaning of sulphur

in China, partly because the proportion of sulphur in the coal is

relatively hígh and the coal itself is relatively difficult to wash.55 The unwashed coal is
causing increased sulphur dioxide emissions and decreased energy efficíency. Thus coal is
used inefficiently and most users rely on raw coal. Untíl recently , China only washed some
22 percent of its coal. Although the Ninth Five-Year Plan requires all new and many existing
coal mines to install coal prep訂ation facilities , with the objective ofwashing 30 percent of all
coal , 56 the proportion remains moderate compared to about 45 percent in the United States
and more 出租 75 percent in Europe. 57
Now is arguably the time for China to further invigorate and implement its energy
policies and shift away from a coal-based development pattem to a more efficient, sustainable
and

environmentally 企iendly

one.

Measures for Efficient Coal Use and Obstacles to Those Measures
Efficient use of coal is

essent凶 bo血 to

avoid

fu仙re

coal shortages and to reduce sulphur

dioxide emissions. If China were to raíse its energy efficiency to the level of dev e1 0ped
countries, it would reduce its coal consumption by one third. 58 Advanced technologies used
ín developed countries can improve efficiency of coal use in China. Unlíke traditional sulphur
scrubbers , advanced clean coal technologies offer China an opportunity to reduce emíssíons
while improving plant e旺iciency or energy output or both戶 The expense of íntroducing such
technologíes , however , restricts their application in China. Coalmines have not invested in
better equipment to produce high-quality coal because they lack the funds. Simílarly, due to
financial restrictions, China's electric power plants wiII not equip desulphurisation devices in
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the near term. The initial cost of the

叮niddle-sized"

device (a device for a 0.5 mw power

plant) is at leac; t US$ 450 million, and the annual operation and rilaintenance costs reach at
least US$ 90 million. Because it needs more energy , China would prefer another power plant
rather than pay the extra costs of installing and maintaining these desulphurisation devices. 60
Thus, developed countries and intemational aid organizations need to work even harder with
China by providing the

fmancing 由at

helps it to introduce advanced technologies

Coal pricing policy is also vital for efficient coal use. By increasing the price of coal
so that it inc1udes the social costs of air pollution, there will be new incentives to consume
coal more efficiently. This would result in resource savings and reduced sulphur dioxide
emissions. AIso , quality-related prices would restrain producers from selling high-quality
coal for expo此， which leaves the dirty coal for the domestic marke t. 61 Prices that re f1 ect
social and environmental costs would give consumers incentives ("signals") to conserve
energy and thereby reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. Coal prices that remain too low
discourage consumers' efficient use and encourage hannful fuel choices. They also encourage
producers' moral hazard. 62
Compared

、叫 th

the energy-rich United States, while the steam-coal prices in China

appear reasonable, those of coking coal remain low and suggest room for price adjustment
(Table 3)
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Table 3: Coal Prices (USS per metric ton)
Steam Coal for Industry:
1996

1997

1998

China

39.88

42.62

37.64

US

35.59

35.7

35.6

Differential

4.29

6.92

2.04

1995

1996

1997

China

40 .2

39.98

42.55

US

52.18

52.18

52.22

Differential

-1 1.98

-12.2

-9 .67

Coking Coal for Industry:

Note: Average unit value at C[F (cargo , insurance and freight) base
Source: Energy Information Administration , "Intemational Coal Price Information," available from
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/internationa l/coa l. html#IntlPrices , accessed 5 June 2002

In fact , China has already taken measures to use coal price signalling, but those measures are
inadequate. China removed most coal price controls in 1994 .的 Before that price
liberalization, the controlled coal prices were too low and the price differences too narrow to
reflect economic costs (mainly transportation costs) and social costs. Following price
liberalization in January 1994 , coal prices increased. The price increase , however , was due
mainly to transportation costs , which account for up to 70 percent of the

deliverγprice

of

“

coal (compared with 30-50 percent in the United States). Price variety is , to a large extent,
dependent on the economic costs of bringing coal to marke t. Hence coal prices , while higher,
still do not reflect full social costs , keeping them low relative to alternative fuels (e.g , oil and
gas) . Th is sustains the heavy reliance on coa 1.

65

Wh ile coal prices remain relatively low , there

will be an under-sllpply of high-grade coals to the domestic marke t. Thlls the social costs of
burning coal and its quality (both are negatively correlated) should be factored into current
prices. The

gove 口unent

environmental factors.

should lift remaining price controls and coal prices should internalise

66

The introduction of these and other coal pricing policies face several obstacI es . The
conservatÏve bureaucracy in China is reluctant to make

23

dr臼tic

changes to coal pricing policy

The Ministry of Coal Industry , which has been absorbed into the State Economic and Trade
Commission , is tradition-bound. So-called "coal bureaucrats"

hold 血e

power to decide coat

prices. 67 1t is unpteasant for them 出at füll market mechanisms should decide coal prices, or
that other ministries related to the environrnent might have rights to affect coal prices.
Furthennore , the relationship between the provincial and central governments hinders
increases in coal prices 也at would reflect true social costs and coal

quality. 甘le

resource tax

on coal sales provides revenue for provincial governments , and it is dependent on the arnount
of coal sold. 68 If the central government were to increase coal prices , coal sales could be
curbed , thus decreasing the revenue ofthe provincial governments. In addition, the resource
tax is not charged on washed and processed coals (i. e. , relatively good quality coals). Insofar
as the central government's coal pricing policy encourages the production ofbetter quality
coals，也at

also reduces provincial governments' revenues. Thus, the central government's

coal pricing policy for sustainable development could face strong resistance 金om provincial
governments.
Another obstac1 e to a new coal pricing policy is China's current short-sighted
economic growth policy, which relies to a great degree on exports. Exports are one ofthe
most important engines of economic

grow由 in

China (Table 4) , and these robust exports are

supported by low energy prices.
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Table 4: China's GDP , Exports , and Exports to GDP
GDP

Exports

Exports to

(bnRMB)

(bn RMB)

GDP (%)

1985

896.4

80.9

9.0

1987

1196.3

147.0

12.3

1989

1690.9

195.6

1 1. 6

1991

216 1. 8

382.7

17.7

1993

3463 .4

528.5

15.3

1995

5847.8

1245.2

2 1. 3

1997

7477.2

1515 .3

20.3

Source: State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, China Statistical Yearbook 1998
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House , 1998), pp. 55 , 620

Furthennore , China's export structure has been shifting from one dominated by primary
commodities to one relying on manufactured goods (Table 5). In other words , China's export
structure has become more reliant on energy consumption
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Table 5: Structure ofExport (U S$ 100 million)

""

Primary Goods
(Share in Total)
Manufactured

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

138.28

132.31

150.78

161 .4 5

166.66

214.85

239.30

(50.6)

(33.5)

(28.7)

(22 .5)

(18 .2)

(14 .4)

(13.1 )

135.22 262.06

374.60

556.98

750.78 1272.95 1587.67

Goods
(Share in Total)
Total

(49 .4)

(66.5)

(71 .3)

(77.5)

273.50

394.37

525 .38

718 .4 3

(81.8)

(85 .6)

(86.9)

917 .44 1487.80 1826.97

Note: 1n 1993 a new commodity catalogue was used in the cllstoms statistics, and products not
otherwise classified in the previous years have been classified and included in different
categories of commodities
Source: State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of Chin a. China Statistical Yearbook 1998
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House , 1998), p. 621

China is not yet exporting high value-added products. 69 China's strategy is to be competitive
in the international market; that 峙， to sell cheaper products in p訂t due to cheaper energy
prices. The Jow energy prices could be described as "invisible subsidies" to export industries,
or what some might label "environmental dumping." (Of course, other countries subsidize
energy prices in various ways, with similar effec t.)

China's Coal Pricing Policy and Agenda 21
Energy pricing policies are essential components of sustainable development. Thus it is not
surprising that they are discussed explicitly in Agenda 21 . Here we look at China's energy
pricing policies in the context ofthe three Agenda 21 chapters summarized above (Chapter 2
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on the relation between trade and energy prices; Chapter 9 on air pollution and energy prices;
and Chapter 33 on applications to energy prices and related development assistance).
In terms of coal pricing policy , Chapter 2 points out several important issues. Most
importantly , the chapter 叮ges that commodity prices should reflect environmental and social
costs (para. 2.14). It also advocates freeing up cornmodity markets to reflect true costs,
presumably advocating price signalling of coal quality from suppliers to consumers through
market mechanisms. Supplementing pricing policies that re f1 ect true social costs, this chapter
also proposes promotion of effective tax systems

(p訂a.

2 .3 7[ f1). Chapter 2 further promotes

removing bureaucratic obstac1 es to the introduction of price po1icies mentioned above (para.
2.37 位]) .

In this context , China decontrolled coal markets and introduced a resource tax

However, as we mentioned earlier, the effect is not enough. Of course , since the focus of
Chapter 2 is mainly agricultural commodities-those that depend on international market
agreements , such as cocoa , coffee, sugar and tropical timber (para. 2.16)-一those quite vit到
issues might have not been considered for coal pricing policies. In addition , though Chapter 2
points to tariff and

non-tari旺 impediments

chapter does not c1 early

caution 出at

as restrictions on intemational trade (p ara. 2.7) , the

to keep domestic energy prices low by neglecting social

cost could be a non-tarifftrade barrier
One objective of Chapter 9 is to reduce adverse effects on the atmosphere from the
energy sector (p ara. 9.11). It urges governments to promote economic measures that improve
energy efficiency (p ara. 9.12[h]) , because energy efficiency 1eads to reduced adverse effects
on the atmosphere (para. 9.11). China has tried to use more legalistic measures , such as
amendment ofthe Air pollutíon Prevention and Control Law. As a useful step both for
prevention of air po lJ ution and for sustainable economic development by energy-savings ,
China should undertake economic measures , such as much more market-driven coal pricing
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1n this sense , Chapter 9 would be more useful for governments if it had been more specific on
the content of recommended economic measures , such as effective energy pricing policies.
~

Chapter 33 focuses on a vital issue for environmental protection projects: financing.
Agenda 21 points out that the bulk of financing for the implementation of sustainable
development will come from the developing countries themse1ves (para. 33.13). Thi s co u1 d
encourage governments to frnance environmental conservation projects, at least partially , by
imp1ementing energy pricing policies that inc1ude new taxes or levies for wastefu1 emissions.
At the same time , Chapter 33 calls for extema1

funds 企om

multilateral development banks ,

bilateral donors , private fun血， etc. Regarding energy pricing policies of fund-receiving
countries, however, the chapter wams multilateral donors not to introduce new forms of
conditionality when disbursing funds to recipient countries (p ara. 33.14[a]). Nevertheless , the
Wo r1 d Bank has already proposed that energy pricing policy in China should be amended to
intemalise costs for environmenta1 protection. Some bi1ateral donors , inc1 uding Japan , a1so
expect China to increase applicable energy prices so that projects relating to energy can be
implemented and maintained without outside funding. To be sure, many deve10ping
countries , in c1 uding China, might view these conditions as interference in their intemal
affairs. However, it seems prudent for funding agencies to continue pushing for new energy
pricing policies that reflect true environmenta1 costs , and to consider attaching efiìciencyrelated conditions (that are more environmentally prudent) on loans that are disbursed by
bilateral and multilatera1 donors

Conclusion
This brief 100k at

one 臼pect

of China's po1icies for economic development suggests that

efforts by governments to negotiate sustainable deve10pment over the last three decades are ,
to some extent , being actualised. The principles propounded in Agenda 21 have been
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reflected , to a limited degree , in China. But even in the narrow (yet vitally important) area of
coal use , there is much room for additional action. This case shows that economic
development and the environment are indeed related issues. Agenda 21 takes this into
account, thereby indicating that energy po1icies-in this case coal pricing policy in Chinaare vital for sustainable developmen t. However, reflecting the

di 伍culty

of negotiating

detailed agreements (even voluntary ones) that can restrict national sovereignty , it does not
clearly specify what energy pricing policy should be in each country. The best policies will
q Ul te

0缸en

depend on each country's

particul缸 situation ，

such as its resource endowment,

type of major energy , and so on. Thus it might be difficult for an international agreement like
Agenda 21 to provide specific guidance for an

issue 但 specific

as coal prices in China. In

other words , the irnpact of Agenda 21 may be limited to general guidance. This limitation
requires a11 actors involved , ranging from national governments and intemational
organizations to bilateral donors and nongovemmental organizations , to consider national
circumstances. This will help overcome domestic obstacles to implementing the objectives of
Agenda 21 and other intemational agreements intended to bring about sustainable
developmen t. Th.i s could be one of the ways for China and interested intemational actors to
defuse the environmental "bombshel l."
Importantly , however, are the underlying motivations most states have for joining and
implementing Agenda 21 and other international agreements and regimes designed to
promote environmentally sustainable development. If a state participates enthusiastically and
genuinely desires to work toward agreed goals , its implementation will be much more robust
If it participates for other reasons , such as to garner intemational aid and technology ,
implementation will occur only insofar as actions can be justified for other, nonenvironmental reasons. China's participation in the Agenda 21 negotiations was guarded. It
sought to protect its sovereignty and freedom of action , and it wanted to extract new funds
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and technology from developed counuies.70 Having said this , extant environmental awareness
was strengthened among Chinese during the UNCED process, and that awareness and
~
p

concem has grown substantially over the last decade as environmental conditions have
deteriorated markedly. This evolution and gro Vvth in underlying support for Agenda 21's
goals suggests that China's sustainable development policies related to coal and energy use ,
as well as other econornic acti\'叫es with environmental consequences, will become more
robust in the future. Whether these policies can overcome resistance 台om provincial
governments and

0伍cials，

weak regulat。可

institutions ，

and the pervasive greed ofpowerful

interests within Chinese government and society , is quite another matter. 71 Arguab旬， the job
。 fthose

in Beijing pushing for more sustainable development is made easier by intemational

environmental agreements because they in.fluence the "credibility , prestige, and financial
resources ofthe national governmen t." 72 What this case shows is that voluntary intemational
environmental agreements can have inf1 uence and can provide guidance for economic
development. But there must be a strong wi l1 ingness among all interested actors to act, as
well as the associated regulatory capacity.
Ofwhat value is Agenda 21 specifically? For China and other developing countries ,
Agenda 21 and other international agreements sharing its principles provide justification for
obtaining international financial and

teclmological 部 sistance

Conditional bilateral aid from Japan and mu Itilateral

from developed countries

funding 企om

intemational financial

institutions are manifestations of this. Furthermore , as environmental awareness grows in
China and other developing countries , particularly among the general population, Agenda 21
provides guidelines and serves as a model for policy action. Increasingly, it can be used by
domestic policy

actors 但 intemational

support for changes in economic policies and

programs
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To be sure , Agenda 21 by itself is of limited utility; it would be wrong to say that it

defines development policy. But it has become part ofthe mix ofincentives , both domestic
and intemational , that shape economic development policies. Combined with the incentives
like new financing , it nudges economic policy in the direction of less envirorunentally
destructive practices. China's environrnental time bomb may yet explode (and arguably is ,
albeit in more-or-less slow motion) , bút it may do so later or in ways that are less harmful to
the natural world or at least more manageable by the intemational community-and the
Chinese themselves
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